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The purpose of this study was to investigate the nature
and extent of subcontract competition at the prime contrac-
tor and subcontractor levels. This area has received in-
creased attention recently due to the emphasis to increase
competition in Government procurement. Information was
gathered by: interviews with personnel of two prime
contractors, review of these prime contractors 1 subcontract
files, and questionnaires sent to subcontractors of these
prime contractors.
This study found the Government's definition of competi-
tion was widely acceptable and could be used as a common
definition, that both prime contractors and subcontractors
were extremely motivated to compete when consistent with
their corporate goals and that they generally achieved a
large amount of subcontract competition. Finally, there
are specific actions the Government can take to increase
the amount of subcontract competition.
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Through United States' history, it has been public
policy for the Federal Government to promote competition to
the maximum practicable extent in its acquisition of goods
and services. Much attention has been drawn to the attempts
and success of the Government in fulfilling this policy and
much effort has been expended to implement this policy. The
focus of much of this attention and effort has been in the
area of competition directly conducted by the Government,
i.e., how much is conducted between the Government and its
prime contractors. Several studies have indicated that as
much as 50% of prime contract funds are passed through the
prime to its subcontractors. In turn, these subcontractors
will generate a certain amount of competition in obtaining
the goods and services needed to fulfill their contracts
with prime contractors.
There are several situations where it is not possible
nor practicable for the Federal Government to obtain compe-
tition. These situations occur where the Government is
forced to contract with a sole source and also where the
Government will contract on a follow-on basis to a single
source who won previous competitions for the product.
Despite attempts to increase the amount of competition
conducted by the Government, there will always be a signi-
ficant number of non-competitive awards. In these cases,
it may be appropriate to concentrate on the amount of
subcontract competition. Although there has been some inter-
est and emphasis in the amount of subcontract competition
conducted by prime contractors, there has not been much
investigation into the extent and nature of competition at
the first and second tier subcontractor levels in the per-
formance of these non-competitive contracts. This study will
examine the definitions of competition used by the Government
and industry to see if there is a common definition that could
be readily used by both parties. It will also attempt to
determine the characteristics of this competition.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
The basic research question for this study is, "What
are the nature and extent of competitive actions by Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) prime contractors and their subcon-
tractors in 'non-competitive' acquisitions of major weapon
systems?
"
The following subsidiary questions were formulated to
further define the basic research question:
How much is ultimately awarded on a competitive basis
by these prime contractors and their subcontractors?
What types of actions do prime contractors and their
subcontractors consider to be competitive and are these
actions compatible with the Government's definition of
competition?
Is there a working definition of competition that can
be used to describe "effective competition" and would
this definition be consistent with the Government
definition of competition?
What is current DOD policy on prime contractor's competing
among their subcontractors and does this policy have
an effect on the amount of competition conducted by
prime contractors?
What motivates prime contractors and their subcontractors
to compete their requirements and does current DOD policy
reinforce these motivations?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The study was limited to DOD prime contractors of major
weapon systems who were awarded their current contracts non-
competitive! y. The study of subcontractors was limited to
the subcontractors of these same prime contractors who were
performing work identified in the "Subcontracted Items"
block of DD Form 633, Contract Pricing Proposal. The work
included in this study consisted of major components and
subsystems integral to the weapon systems, and major support
systems used to test and evaluate the weapon system. Service
subcontracts and subcontracts valued less than $500,000.00
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were not included in this study. Also, no attempt was made
to assess the impact of socio-economic programs such as the
Small and Disadvantaged Business program except to the ex-
tent that these programs may have been mentioned or discussed
by either prime or subcontractors. A questionnaire (discussed
in the next section) was used to gather subcontractor infor-
mation. There may be some bias in this information in that
over 9 0% of the responding subcontractors were also current
DOD prime contractors. This percentage was greater than expect-
ed. Once the researchers discovered this, it was felt that
some bias could be introduced. It is felt, however, that
this bias is not significant because: 1) many respondents
specifically noted they were responding as subcontractors,
and (2) the positions they took in several of their answers
could be clearly related to an expected subcontractor posi-
tion. It is assumed that the reader is reasonably familiar
with standard DOD contracting concepts, procedures, and
terminology.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study consisted
primarily of three basic components: (1) the use of personal
interviews, (2) review of subcontract files, and (3) the use
of questionnaires. The interviews were conducted with prime
contractor executives involved in contracting and subcontract-
ing. The questionnaires were sent to selected subcontractors.
Two DOD prime contractors were selected according to the
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following criteria: prime contractors of major weapon systems
whose current contracts were non-competit ively awarded.
The scope of work contained a large potential for subcon-
tracting, prime contractors were willing to discuss these
contracts and their subcontracting processes for this study,
and the necessary data could be identified to the contracts
under study. Five major weapon system programs were selected
and the subcontractor files reviewed for the study were
selected from these five programs. The criteria for selecting
the subcontractors to receive a questionnaire were: one of
the primes' subcontractors, the subcontract value was greater
than $500,000.00, the nature of the subcontractor's work
contained a large potential for further subcontracting to
the second tier level, and the prime was willing to allow
the mailing of the questionnaire to the subcontractor. The
questions put to both prime and subcontractors appear in
Appendices A and B, respectively. Finally, dollar amounts
were used to measure the extent of competition, except where
noted, rather than the number of competitive actions, since
the researcher felt that this data would be both more
readily available and a better reflection of the economic
impact of the competition.
E. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Although recently receiving more attention, there is
not yet much current information on this subject. The
12
available literature is limited to a few student theses and
Government sponsored studies
.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) recently
completed a study of competition in the award of subcon-
tracts by prime contractors. The basic findings of this
study were that the amount of subcontract competition can
and should be increased. The study found that there was not
any need for a comprehensive subcontract data collection
system and that existing systems were sufficient [Ref. 1:
pp. 20-21] .
The Army Procurement Research Office (APRO) issued a
study entitled "Subcontract Competition" that concluded that
a substantial portion of defense dollars are redistributed
competitively through subcontracts [Ref. 2: p. 25]. The
high number of constraints that can affect subcontract com-
petition causes a great deal of variability in how much
subcontract competition is conducted from program-to-program.
The study also concluded that while the amount of subcon-
tract competition could be increased, the number of constraints
and unique program requirements would preclude establishing
a single overall standard [Ref. 2: pp. 25-26].
A Master's Thesis titled "The Need to Increase Competi-
tion at the Subcontract Level" by LT David A. Capizzi con-
cluded that the actual extent of subcontract competition is
unknown due to lack of .a reporting system and common defini-
tions of competition used by the Government and industry
13
[Ref. 3: p. 77]. Prime contractors, subcontractors, and
Government policies exert pressure that makes increasing
subcontract competition difficult. While the Government's
systems for encouraging subcontract competition are not
always effective, there are other ways the Government can
influence the amount of subcontract competition conducted by
the prime contractor. Until the actual amount of subcon-
tract competition can be measured, it is not feasible to
recommend that it be increased. Capizzi concludes that if
it is deemed necessary to increase subcontract competition,
then a reporting system must be developed to allow measurement
of subcontract competition and the best way of increasing it
would be to develop a clause requiring all subcontracts be
awarded on a competitive basis [Ref. 3: pp. 77-81].
F. DEFINITIONS
The definitions of subcontractors and subcontracts used
in this study were obtained from the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR). The FAR defines a subcontract as:
...any contract ... entered into by a subcontractor to
furnish supplies or services for performance of a
prime contract or a subcontract. It includes but is
not limited to purchase orders, and changes and
modifications to purchase orders. [Ref. 4: 44.101]*
FAR also defines a subcontractor to be "any supplier,
distributor, vendor, or a firm that furnishes supplies or
*
All references to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
and the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation indicate the appropriate section
rather than page number.
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services to or for a prime contractor or another subcon-
tractor" [Ref. 4: 44.101].
The term major subcontract was used to define the type
of subcontracts to be reviewed for this study. A major
subcontract was any subcontract entered into by the prime
contractor for the acquisition of hardware (major subsystems
or components) . This hardware must have been either integral
to the weapon system or necessary to support its production.
Furthermore, the total value of the subcontract had to be
greater than $500,000.00.
The definitions of competition used in this study were
based upon the Government definition of price competition
contained in the FAR:
Price competition exists if--
(i) offers are solicited;
(ii) two or more responsible offerors that can
satisfy the Government's requirements submit priced
offers responsive to the solicitation's expressed
requirements
;
and (iii) these offerors compete independently for a
contract to be awarded to the responsible offeror
submitting the lowest evaluated price. [Ref. 4:
15.804-3(b) (1)
]
Furthermore, FAR states that even though the above condi-
tions exist, price competition cannot be assumed to have
been adequate if it is found that:
(i) the soliciation was made under conditions that
unreasonably deny to one or more known and qualified
offerors an opportunity to compete;
(ii) the low competitor has such a decided advantage
that it is practically immune from competition; or
15
(iii) there is a finding, supported by a statement of
the facts and approved at a level above the contracting
officer, that the lowest price is unreasonable.
[Ref . 4: 15.804-3(b) (2)
]
Design or technical competition is defined in the Depart-
ment of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regu-
lation (DOD FAR Supplement) as "to be present when 2 or more
qualified sources of supply are invited to submit design or
technical proposals, with the subsequent contract award
based primarily on this factor, rather than on a price basis"
[Ref. 5: 4.671-5(c) (ii) (B) ]
.
Follow-on after either design or technical competition
or after price competition is also defined in the DOD FAR
Supplement as being subsequent contract awards or supplemen-
tal agreements for new procurements of the same item to a
source initially established in a prior year as a result of
either design or technical competition or price competition
[Ref. 5: 4.671-5(c) (ii) (C) ]
Major weapon system acquisition programs are programs
that: "1) are directed at and critical to fulfilling an
agency mission, 2) entail the allocation of relatively large
resources, and 3) warrant special management attention"
[Ref. 6: p. 3]
.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II will be a discussion of the major weapon
systems acquisition process and how the various types of
non-competitive contract situations develop. The basic
16
theory of competition will be discussed as well as Federal
Government competition policy in both prime and subcontract
awards. Chapter III will be a presentation of the prime
contractors' and subcontractors' definitions of competition,
which will be compared to the Government's definition to
determine if there is one definition that would be acceptable
for common use. Chapter IV will state the motivations and
disincentives for prime contractors to obtain competition
in their subcontract management, as well as the methods they
use to achieve subcontract competition. Chapter V will be
structured essentially the same as Chapter IV, with the
subcontractors being the subject of analysis. Chapter VI will
assess the policy implications for the Government given the
findings at the prime contractor and subcontractor levels.
Chapter VII will present the conclusions and recommendations
that follow from the previous analysis.
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II . FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will establish the conceptual framework for
the role of competition in the major weapon systems acquisi-
tion process. The chapter begins with a description of the
major weapon system acquisition process. The two types of
competition, design/technical and price, are discussed, and
then relevant economic theory on market structure is pre-
sented. Government competitive policy with respect to both
prime contractors and subcontractors is examined. The rela-
tionships among the Government, prime contractors, and sub-
contractors are examined to determine how Government policy
is implemented through these relationships. Specific
Government programs for achieving competition are presented.
Finally, the five major weapon systems included in this
study are described.
B. MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS
Overall policy and guidance for the acquisition of major
weapon systems by executive branch agencies is contained
in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-109,
"Major System Acquisitions." The general policy established
in this Circular is aimed at "assuring the' effectiveness and
efficiency of the process of acquiring major systems" [Ref.,6
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p. 3] . This policy is implemented for the DOD in DOD Direc-
tive 5000.1, "Major System Acquisitions," and DOD Instruction
5000.2, "Major System Acquisition Procedures." DOD Directive
5000.1 sets overall acquisition management principles and
objectives to be followed in the acquisition of major systems,
identifies the major decision points, and assigns responsi-
bilities for ensuring the policies are followed. The actual
procedures and required documentation for managing DOD major
systems are contained in DOD Instruction 5000.2.
Development of a major weapon system is initiated during
the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) . Once
initiated, the acquisition cycle consists of four main phases,
concept exploration, demonstration and validation, full-scale
development, and production and deployment. During the PPBS
process, the military services identify deficiencies in their
ability to carry out assigned responsibilities. Some of these
deficiencies require new and extensive programs to correct.
These deficiencies are subsequently referred to as "mission
needs .
"
The document which defines a particular mission need is
the Justification for Major System New Starts (JMSNS) . The
JMSNS is submitted to the Secretary of Defense with the Pro-
gram Objective Memorandum (POM) . Secretary of Defense
approval of the program is documented by the Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) , and authorizes the new program to be
included in the DOD budget.
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This approval allows the service component to start the
concept exploration phase. During this phase, alternative
concepts for meeting the need are solicited from industry,
in-house Research and Development centers, and non-profit
institutions such as universities. Proposed concepts will
include estimates of their life cycle costs, development
schedule, and performance. The various concepts are then
evaluated to select the most promising concept (s) for con-
tinuation. The competition in this phase is primarily design
oriented; trying to determine the best technical approach to
solve the mission need. The results are summarized in the
System Concept Paper (SCP) , which is submitted to the Secre-
tary of Defense. The SCP will include the concepts selected
for further development, the reasons for elimination of other
concepts, and the acquisition strategy for the selected con-
cepts. The acquisition strategy should include, in addition
to other basic management concepts, general evaluation cri-
teria, the methods for obtaining and maintaining competition
during the acquisition cycle, possible tailoring of the
acquisition cycle, and the proposed contract type for each
of the phases.
Approval to start the next phase, demonstration and vali-
dation, is granted by the Secretary of Defense Decision
Memorandum (SDDM) at Milestone 1 and is based upon the infor-
mation contained in the SCP. The SDDM validates the require-
ment and also establishes cost, schedule, and performance
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thresholds and objectives to be met and reviewed at the next
decision point. It also approves the acquisition strategy
to be followed, and establishes a budget limit for the pro-
gram. The basic purpose of the demonstration and validation
phase is to validate the preliminary designs of the competing
systems for the full-scale development phase. Prototypes
can be used to demonstrate the validity of each system
concept and the feasibility of their respective designs.
The results of the demonstration and validation phase
are documented in the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) and
when necessary, the Integrated Program Summary (IPS) . The
DCP is a summary document containing much the same type of
data as the SCP , with some sections in greater detail.
These sections describe the selected alternative, identify
the technological risks of that alternative, and describe
the acquisition strategy. If more detailed information is
required for evaluation of the alternatives, an IPS is sub-
mitted. The IPS contains more specific program information,
as well as a comprehensive summary of the program. These
documents are submitted to the Secretary of Defense, who
will then issue the Milestone II decision in a SDDM. A
favorable Milestone II decision grants approval for the
program to enter into full-scale development. Design compe-
tition will normally be conducted up to the Milestone II
decision, with one design selected to enter full-scale develop-
ment. It is possible for design competition to continue
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through the full-scale development phase if it is deemed cost
effective for the Government to do so. For the purposes of
this description, it will be assumed that design competition
ended at Milestone II.
The full-scale development phase is characterized by an
iterative design-retest-design process that will result in a
final product design. This phase may actually be comprised
of three sub-phases: engineering, prototype, and pilot pro-
duction. The objective of this phase is "the demonstration
and documentation of a cost-effective, operationally
suitable, reliable, and maintainable production-engineered
system that meets the mission needs" [Ref. 7: p. 2-55].
The acquisition strategy must be updated at this point.
In addition to incorporating any changes identified in the
SDDM or by other higher authority, it is important to review
the competitive situation. The prime contractor will want to
maintain or create a sole source situation, and historically
this situation does result. Although the design competition is
over, it is possible to introduce price competition into
the production phase instead of having a sole source con-
tractor, or to offset the potentially non-competitive
effects of having a sole source contractor. This can be
accomplished by planning for dual production sources or by
the identification of high cost components to be procured
competitively by the Government and supplied to the prime
as Government Furnished Equipment [Ref. 7: pp. 2-55, 2-56].
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If these methods are to be used in the production phase,
planning for them should begin as early as possible.
Normally, the production decision, Milestone III, is
delegated by the Secretary of Defense to each of the Secre-
taries of the Military Departments. The objective of the
production and deployment phase is to field a fully opera-
tional system. This includes providing technical documenta-
tion, training and support facilities, and Integrated
Logistics Support.
C. THEORY OF COMPETITION
1 . Role of Design/Technical Competition
The typical major weapon system is extremely complex
In the early stages of the acquisition process, extensive
technical effort is required to design a system that will
meet all objectives. The overall objectives for the system
are to meet: mission need, cost, schedule, readiness, and
af fordability . There are also many support considerations
and tradeoffs that must be made during system design. These
include maintainability and reliability, logistical require-
ments, personnel manning levels and attendant skill levels,
system survivability/vulnerability tradeoffs, and life cycle
costs [Ref . 7: p. 2-45] . A concerted design effort is
necessary to fully integrate all of these objectives to the
maximum extent. Since there are many possible combinations
of these objectives, industry wide design competition is the
best way to identify the maximum number of possible concepts
23
The subsequent evaluation of these alternative concepts will
identify the best one [Ref. 8: p. 26]. Once the system
design is selected, a primary concern becomes to obtain
that system for the lowest possible price.
2 . Pricing Theory in Commercial Markets
Modern economic theory holds that the market struc-
ture determines the price of products in that market. There
is a spectrum of different market structures in our economy,
ranging from perfect competition to monopoly.
The best market structure to establish the lowest
price is the perfectly competitive market. This type of
market is characterized by large numbers of firms producing
homogeneous products. Economists have defined perfect com-
petition to occur only when all of the following four condi-
tions are present: "No participant in the market can
influence price; output must be homogeneous; resources must
be mobile; and there must be perfect knowledge" [Ref. 9:
p. 276]. In reality, perfect competition does not exist,
although most commercial markets may contain some, but not
all, of the above conditions.
Monopoly is at the opposite end of the market spec-
trum. The basic market condition necessary for a monopoly
is that there must be only one seller [Ref. 9: p. 280]. This
market is characterized also by barriers to entry and exit
from the market and imperfect market knowledge. It is held
that, when compared to a perfectly competitive market, prices
24
will be higher and output will be lower in a monopolistic
market [Ref . 9 : p. 311]
.
In between these two extremes, there are two other
types of market structure, monopolistic competition and
oligopoly. Monopolistic competition is characterized by
a large number of firms making products that are relatively
close substitutes. The firms differentiate their products
through advertising. There are three tactics the firms can
use to change their sales: they can change their prices,
change their product, or change their advertising expenditures
[Ref. 9: pp. 315-316] . Firms in this market will tend to
produce less and charge higher prices than in a perfectly
competitive market, but will still produce more at a lower
price than a monopoly [Ref. 9: p. 328] . Oligopoly is a common
market form in our economy and is characterized by a small
number of firms that are quite interdependent. Any changes
in price or output by one firm will affect the other firms
[Ref. 9: p. 333] . These firms will generally use advertising
to change sales rather than price changes, so prices tend to
be more stable. Prices will generally be higher and output
will be less in an oligopoly than under perfect competition.
The firms will also incur relatively high advertising expenses
Finally, oligopolistic firms will enjoy higher profits than
perfectly competitive firms [Ref. 9: pp. 358-359].
The prime contractors and subcontractors operate in
one of these three types of market structure: monopoly,
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monopolistic competition, or oligopoly. Therefore, competi-
tion will play a role in determining the prices of their
products and the cost of their purchased goods and services.
3 . Market for Major Weapon Systems
The market in which major weapon systems are procured
is unique, with many differences between it and commercial
markets. Some of these differences are: how the market size
is determined, how the price of the product is determined,
and the fact that there is only one buyer in the market [Ref.
10: pp. 37-38] . The overall size of the market is determined
by Congress through the appropriation process, rather than
supply and demand. The price of the weapon system is deter-
mined more by the costs incurred, rather than market forces.
The Government is the only buyer and frequently becomes
committed to one source as a result of the major weapon sys-
tems acquisition process. Also, due to the large capital
investment required, the Government often assists the con-
tractor in making the financial investment. This situation
creates a "bilateral monopoly, " defined as being a market
in which a single buyer and a single seller exist interde-
pendently; neither can survive without the other" [Ref. 10:
p. 38] .
Another unique market structure is a duopoly, where
there are only two sellers in the market [Ref. 11: p. 15-
12]. This is usually an artificial market, created and
supported by the Government. This sort of market can occur
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as a result of the Government decision to create a second
production source for a major weapon system [Ref. 11: p.
15-12] .
If the government wants to create this type of market,
it must be prepared to incur considerable front-end costs.
These costs result from either extended design competition
or, in the case of dual production sources, heavy investment
costs to qualify two sources. There are five categories of
start-up costs for dual sourcing: cost of technological
transfer, special tooling, higher product costs initially
due to learning by the new source, additional Government
administrative costs to deal with two sources, and potential
additional logistics costs caused by supporting two slightly
different systems [Ref. 12: p. 2-11]. It is hoped that
cost savings caused by the resulting competition will offset
these start-up costs. There is some risk that savings may
not be realized and that the start-up costs will not be
recovered [Ref. 12: p. 2-10].
D. GOVERNMENT COMPETITION POLICY
1 . Government Competition Policy
Overall Government policy is that competition shall
be utilized to the maximum practical extent in the acquisi-
tion of goods and services. This policy is reflected in the
acquisition of major weapon systems by the policy that Federal
Agencies will allow competition in the early stages of the
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acquisition process by considering alternative design
concepts to fulfill mission needs [Ref . 6: p. 3] . An express
management objective of the major weapon systems acquisition
process is to "depend on, whenever economically feasible,
competition between similar or differing system design con-
cepts throughout the entire acquisition process" [Ref. 6:
p. 4]. Furthermore, an acquisition strategy must be tailored
to the program that must address, among other considerations,
"methods for obtaining and sustaining competition" [Ref. 6:
p. 5] .
This policy is also reflected in the FAR by the
preference for the most competitive method of procurement,
formal advertising [Ref. 4: 14 . 10 3-1 (a) ] . There are four
criteria that must be applied to determine if this method of
procurement is proper. These are: the dollar amounts of the
contract must be large enough to justify the expense, ade-
quate specifications are available, adequate numbers of
sellers in the market, these sellers must want the business
and bid competitively for it, and there must be adequate
time available [Ref. 13: p. 97] . Based upon these criteria,
formal advertising is an inappropriate method of obtaining
major weapon systems. Adequate specifications are not avail-
able, nor is there adequate competition in the market [Ref.
12: p. 1.4]. When formal advertising cannot be utilized,
and negotiation must be used, "negotiated contracts shall be
awarded on a competitive basis to the maximum practical extent"
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[Ref. 4: 15.105]. This process is more appropriate for major
weapon systems procurement and competition is possible.
Recently there has been increased emphasis on com-
petition within the Executive Branch. In a recent Executive
Order, the President directed more effective procurement by
"enhancing effective competition and limiting non-competitive
actions" [Ref. 14: p. 1]
.
Recent judicial action has also emphasized that the
requirement for competition, as stated in the Defense Acqui-
sition Regulations, is a legal requirement [Ref. 15: p. 1].
In a recent case, the Department of the Navy was cited for
bad faith because it had not followed court orders to stimu-
late competition. While the court agreed with the Navy's
initial sole source justification, it noted that the excep-
tion to formal advertising used by the Department of the
Navy required that the Contracting Officer take steps to
foster competition in subsequent procurements. The Court
found that the Navy had not taken these steps. This avenue
may be used increasingly by contractors to protest non-
competitive Government procurements [Ref. 15: p. 4].
The relationship between the Government and the prime
contractor is characterized by a "privity of contract."
There is a legally binding relationship formed between the
two parties and described by the terms and conditions of the
contract. These terms and conditions are based upon Federal
procurement law [Ref. 16: pp. 38-39]. Government competition
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policy will be reflected in the Government procurement
methods and the terms and conditions of the prime contracts.
If the contractors want to do business with the Government,
they will have to comply with these policies.
2 . Government Subcontract Competition Policy
The relationship between a prime contractor and his
subcontractor are similar to that between the Government
and the prime contractor in that a direct legal relationship
is formed, characterized again by a "privity of contract."
Although the legal relationship is governed by the rules of
commercial contract law, rather than by Federal Regulations,
there are cases where the subcontractors are subject to
Government controls [Ref. 16: pp. 39-40].
The relationship between the Government and the
subcontractor is marked by the lack of any sort of "privity
of contract," and so there is no legal relationship between
the two parties [Ref. 16: p. 41]. There are many examples
of instances where, despite this lack of privity, the
Government has established
procedures and mechanisms ... to influence the direct
prime contractor-subcontractor relationship, as well
as maintain some degree of visibility and control over
key prime contractor suppliers, thereby creating at
least an indirect relation with subcontractors.
[Ref. 16: p. 53]
Some of these procedures and mechanisms are programs
that directly affect the nature and extent of subcontract
competition obtained by the prime contractor. Current
Government policy to achieve maximum competition is
30
reflected in four programs. These are the Contractor Pur-
chasing System Review (CPSR), Consent to Subcontracts,
Make-or-Buy Program, and Component Breakout.
The CPSR evaluates the efficiency and effectiveness
of a prime contractor's purchasing system. The primary
concerns of the CPSR are:
a. The degree of price competition obtained;
b. Pricing policies and techniques, including methods
of obtaining accurate, complete, and current cost
or pricing data and certification as required;
c. Methods of evaluating subcontractors' responsibility;
d. Treatment accorded affiliates and other concerns
having close working arrangements with the
contractor;
e. Policies and procedures pertaining to labor surplus




Planning, award, and postaward management of
major subcontract programs;
g. Compliance with Cost Accounting Standards in
awarding subcontracts; and
h. Appropriateness of types of contracts used...
[Ref . 4: 44.303]
.
The CPSR is used as a basis for Contracting Officer
approval of contractors' purchasing systems. This approval
allows waiver of some contractual requirements, such as
Consent to Subcontracts.
Consent to Subcontracts is the Contracting Officer's
written permission for a prime to enter into a subcontract.
The basic guidance is that consent is required when:
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the subcontract work is complex, the dollar value is
substantial, or the Government's interest is not
adequately protected by competition and the type of
prime contract or subcontract." [Ref . 4: 44.10 2]
Other considerations also determine the applicability
of consent, such as type of prime contract and the type of
service being procured.
The basic purpose of consent is to help assure that
the goods and services being procured and the method by which
they are procured is in the best interests of the Government.
Prior to granting consent, the Contracting Officer is respon-
sible for considering the following factors:
1) Is the decision to subcontract consistent with the
contractor's approved make-or-buy program, if any...?
2) Is the subcontract for special test equipment or
facilities that are available from Government
sources . . . ?
3) Is the selection of the particular supplies, equip-
ment, or services technically justified?
4) Has the contractor complied with the prime contract
requirements regarding labor surplus area or small
business subcontracting, including, if applicable,
its plan for subcontracting with small business
concerns and small disadvantaged business concerns...?
5) Was the price competition obtained or its absence
properly justified?
6) Did the contractor adequately assess and dispose of
subcontractors' alternate proposals, if offered?
7) Does the contractor have a good sound basis for
selecting and determining the responsibility of
the particular subcontractor?
8) Has the contractor performed adequate cost or
price analysis or price comparisons and obtained
accurate, complete, and current cost or pricing
data, including any required certifications?
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9) Is the proposed subcontract type appropriate for
the risks involved and consistent with current
policy?
10) Has adequate consideration been obtained for any
proposed subcontract that will involve the use
of Government-furnished facilities?
11) Has the contractor adequately and reasonably trans-
lated prime contract technical requirements into
subcontract requirements?
12) Does the prime contractor comply with applicable
cost accounting standards for awarding the
subcontract?
13) Is the proposed subcontractor on the Consolidated
List of Debarred, Suspended, and Ineligible
Contractors . . .
?
b) Particularly careful and thorough consideration...
is necessary when--
1) The prime contractor's purchasing system or perfor-
mance is inadequate;
2) Close working relationships or ownership affilia-
tions between the prime and subcontractor may
preclude free competition or result in higher
prices;
3) Subcontracts are proposed for award on a non-
competitive basis, at prices that appear unreasonable,
or at prices higher than those offered to the
Government in comparable circumstances; or
4) Subcontracts are proposed on a cost-reimbursement,
time-and-materials, or labor hour basis.
[Ref. 4: 44.202-2]
The Make-or-Buy program simply refers to the con-
tractor's plan for acquiring major components either through
in-house manufacture or subcontracting. Due to the criteria
for requiring a make or buy plan, most major weapon systems
contracts include such a plan. While the basic responsi-
bility for make-or-buy decisions lies with the contractor,
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the Government must review the program primarily to "ensure
negotiation of reasonable contract prices, satisfactory per-
formance, or implementation of socio-economic policies"
[Ref. 1: p. 5]. As long as the program is not inconsistent
with the interests of the Government, the program should be
approved [Ref. 4: 15.706(c)].
Component Breakout is a method the Government uses
to introduce or maintain competition during the production
phase. Major components are identified that can potentially
be competitively procured by the Government and then furnished
to the prime contractor as Government-furnished material.
The basic policy governing breakout is that it should be
done where
...the prime contract for a weapons system. . .will be
awarded without adequate price competition, and the
prime contractor is expected to acquire a component
without such competition, ... if
:
a) substantial net cost savings will probably
be achieved; and b) such action will not jeopardize
the quality, reliability, performance or timely
delivery of the end item.
The desirability of breakout should also be considered
(regardless of whether the prime contract or the
component being purchased by the prime contractor is on
the basis of price competition) whenever substantial net
cost savings will result 1) from greater quantity pur-
chases or 2) from such factors as improved logistics
support through reduction in varieties of spare parts
and economies in operations and training through
standardization of design. [Ref. 5: 17.7202-2]
Decisions on breakout are tempered by assessing any
risks, involved, calculating expected cost savings, and
analyzing other factors [Ref. 5: 17.7202-4J. This program
effectively reduces the amount of subcontracting a prime
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All five of the programs investigated were in the aero-
space industry and qualified as major weapon systems under
current DOD policy.
The first program is for a new airframe for an existing
communications system. The Full-Scale Development (FSD)
effort was competitively awarded under a firm fixed-price
(FFP) contract. The production contract is expected to be
awarded on the basis of follow-on to competition and also be
a FFP contract. The final effort will be for 15 units and
total cost is expected to exceed $1.5 billion. Currently,
there are nine major subcontractors, of which three were
customer directed, two were sole source and four were
selected competitively.
The second program is for a new airframe that contained
a new surveillance system. The development effort was
competitively awarded under a Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF)
contract. It is a mature program that has been in production
under a FFP contract since the mid-1970's. Total production
has been 31 units valued at approximately $2.8 billion.
The third program is for the rework of 100 existing
missile tubes. The program was awarded on a sole source
basis, due to the company's prior experience, under a FFP
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contract. It is estimated that the total value of the con-
tract will be approximately $1.5 billion. Due to the early
stage of the program, there has not been much significant
subcontracting effort although the company expects that they
may eventually have 20 to 30 major subcontractors. Of these,
only one is sole source, two will be customer directed, and
the remaining subcontractors determined competitively.
The fourth program is for a missile system that is cur-
rently in the production phase. The FSD effort was awarded
competitively under a Fixed Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) con-
tract. The current production contract is for 330 units
valued at approximately $180 million under a FFP contract
that was awarded on a follow-on to competition basis. There
are 18 major subcontractors of which one is sole source,
none are customer directed, and the rest competitively
determined.
The fifth program is for an upgraded missile system that
is currently in FSD under a CPIF contract. The contract
was awarded on a sole source basis to the original missile
contractor due to their reliability and experience from
previous missile systems. The total production quantity will
be 72, with the total contract valued at approximately $6.8
billion.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has described the major weapon system
acquisition process. The two types of competition were
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discussed and the types of market structures that were found
in both the commercial market and the market in which major
weapon systems were procured. The differences in these
markets were primarily in the number of buyers and sellers,
and the amount of available knowledge with respect to the
exact nature of the system being procured. Basic Government
competitive policies were described. The relationships
among the Government, prime contractors, and subcontractors
was discussed to establish the framework in which the
Government implemented some of its competition-enhancing
programs and these programs were defined. Finally, the
five programs reviewed for this study were described. The
next chapter will present the prime contractors' and subcon-
tractors' definitions of competition and how much competition
in subcontracts was achieved at each level
.
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III. DEFINITION AND EXTENT OF SUBCONTRACT COMPETITION
AT THE PRIME CONTRACTOR AND SUBCONTRACTOR LEVEL
A. INTRODUCTION
Both the primes' and subcontractors' definitions of com-
petition will be presented and compared with the Government's
definition. The differences will be examined to determine
whether or not a common definition of competition exists
that is compatible with both industry's and the Government's
definitions. The amounts of competition conducted, using
both industry's and the Government's definition, will be
compared to determine whether or not there is a significant
difference caused by the different definitions.
B. DEFINITIONS OF COMPETITION
1 . Prime Contractors' Definitions
Prime contractors were asked to compare their com-
pany's definition of competition with the following Government
definition that addressed both price and technical competition
Price competition is defined to be where offers are
solicited from all known sources and at least two
responsible offerors who can satisfy the requirement
independently contend for the contract by submitting
responsive offers. Furthermore, the low offeror cannot
have such a competitive advantage that he is practically
immune to competitive forces and the lowest price
offered is reasonable. Design or technical competition
is where two or more qualified sources of supply are
invited to submit design or technical proposals, with
the contract award based upon this factor, rather than
price alone.
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Although during interviews, personnel from both prime
contractors stated that they agreed with the Government's
definition of competition and their material procedures also
contained definitions of price competition that were essen-
tially the same as the Government's, there were some
differences.
One of the contractors acknowledged there were two
types of purchase actions included in their definition of
what they termed "traditional" or price competition: 1) "pure"
price competition where they solicited known and reliable
suppliers using definitive specifications, with the award
based upon lowest price, and 2) best "evaluated" price where
the specifications were not as definitive. In the latter
type, many other factors rather than price alone were used
in determining the successful supplier. These factors were:
technical approach, management, product quality, manufac-
turing capability, cost, and reliability and safety. Formal
source selection procedures are established where weights
are assigned to these factors and the best overall proposal
receives the award. The prime contractor said that their
design/technical competition was included in this category.
The only category that coincided with the definition
of adequate price competition as specified in FAR with
regard to exemption to the requirement to submit cost and
pricing data was the "pure" price competition situation
[Ref . 4 : 15.804-3]
.
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This contractor also had other categories of buys
included in the definition of competition. If an item had
been competed according to the above "traditional" definition
in a previous related program, the follow-on buy to the
previous source for the current program was to be counted as
competition. A last category consisted of buys made as a
result of an internal technical evaluation, without regard
to price. Evaluation techniques included review of a com-
pany's technical literature, in-house testing of sample
products, and sending out Requests for Information (RFI)
and/or Requests for Proposals (RFP) . Evaluation criteria
in these cases could run from being fairly subjective to
completely objective. Once a source was selected in this
manner, specifications were developed and the buy was made
on a single/sole source basis. This contractor did not
distinguish between a single source and a sole source.
Specific subcontract competition goals have been
set for this contractor in performing the contract and all
of the above categories will be reported as competition
under the contract.
The second prime contractor's only formal definition
of competition, found in a statement of corporate policy,
referred to "initial" competition:
Therefore, initial and follow on procurement, except
as qualified herein, shall be based upon effective
competition by securing bids from three or more
sources which submit a competitive bid, are quali-
fied to perform the specified work, and will accept
the contract if awarded.
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This definition of "initial" competition applies to
this contractor's methods of obtaining competition that are
essentially the same as those contained in the other con-
tractor's definition of price competition: where there is
adequate price competition as defined by the FAR, the company
is exempt from submitting cost and pricing data and have
source selection procedures that determine the best overall
proposal
.
Other types of purchase actions included in their
definition of price competition: (1) follow-on to competi-
tion when the competition has been conducted within one
year, and (2) the exercise of options on a competitively
awarded contract.
One last minor difference is that this company
requires that at least three or more sources be solicited
in order to call it effective competition.
Neither company solicited from "all known sources,"
but rather would either prequalify the companies to be
solicited or select potential sources from among companies
with known performance. The two primary reasons given for
these procedures were: (1) to reduce the administrative
cost of having to evaluate many proposals, some from com-
panies with little chance of winning the contract, and (2) to
avoid having the potential source spending time and effort
in a futile effort to win the contract.
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2 . Subcontractors' Definitions
Subcontractors were asked to compare the same
Government definition of competition to their official
definition of competition. Fully two-thirds of the respon-
dents stated that their definition was essentially the same
as the Government's. Another 24% basically agreed with the
Government's, but identified some differences. The first
difference was that the subcontractors did not solicit from
"all known sources." The reasons for this were identical
to the reasons given above by the prime contractors. The
second difference was that some subcontractors required that
at least three responses be obtained in order to consider
that price was based on competition. Some other minor excep-
tions were noted. One subcontractor took exception to the
prohibition of a company having "such a competitive advantage
that he is practically immune to competitive forces," saying
that he did not understand why the Government would exclude
this from their definitions.
Two subcontractors did not fully agree with the
Government definition with regard to both price and design/
technical competition. One company did not engage in any
type of price competition, only technical competition.
The other company did not recognize design/technical compe-
tition because they felt it was so subjective as to be
meaningless.
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3 . Comparison with Government
There was no significant disagreement among either the
primes or the subcontractors as to what was an acceptable
definition of competition. The only difference observed was
in the number of sources solicited. The Government definition
encourages including all known sources, while the primes and
subcontractors prefer to restrict the number of sources
solicited. These sources were among the best available, at
least in the opinion of the companies. This would imply that
competitive market forces were encouraging the suppliers to
perform well. Suppliers, after trying vigorously to get on
a prime contractor's bidding list, would perform well in
order to remain a supplier of the prime contractor. Besides,
the Government definition is aimed more at ensuring that no
one is unreasonably denied the opportunity to bid. Company
efforts to increase competition will be examined in the next
chapter
.
Differences were found in the types of actions in-
cluded under the term competition, especially follow-on to
competition and internal technical reviews. While there may
be some justification for considering follow-on to competition
as competitive, there does seem to be a problem regarding
the length of time after the initial competition that the
benefits of that competition will continue to be realized.
One prime considered the benefits of the initial competition
to last over many years, while the other prime contractor
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felt that the benefit would last only for about one year
from the initial award. It is obvious that there has been
some competitive benefit realized in follow-on procurement
actions, but as the length of time from the initial competi-
tion increases, benefits may become diminished.
The Government now recognizes the unique status of
follcw-on to competition actions. Previously, these actions
had been classified as non-competitive in the Federal Pro-
curement Data System (FPDS) and caused seme concern throughout
industry that this classification did not fully reflect the
extent of competition in DOD procurement [Ref . 17: p. 1]
.
There are now seven categories used to classify negotiated
procurement actions according to the extent of competition.
These are:
a. price competition
b. design or technical competition
c. follow-on after price competition




noncompetition based upon catalog or market price
g. competition not applicable. [Ref. 5: 4 . 671-5 ( c) ( 5)
]
Finally, one of the prime contractors used an internal
technical evaluation that was considered to be competitive.
This evaluation technique does contain some elements of
competition, in that several different products are evaluated
against one another. The researcher would observe that this
completely internal procedure does not always inform the
potential suppliers of the evaluation and so does not give
them the opportunity to fully describe all of their products
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and capabilities. The prime contractor's personnel may be
unaware of some of these products or capabilities that would
conform to the prime contractor's needs. The researcher
believes that the inconsistent and subjective nature of this
evaluation technique make it incompatible with the Govern-
ment's definition of competition.
C. AMOUNT OF COMPETITION
1 . Prime Contractors
A total of 70 major subcontracts were examined and
the most predominant type of competition conducted was the
type that is similar to the Government's competitive nego-
tiated procurements. Competition where price alone was the
only selection criterion was observed only twice in this
study. The reason most often given for this was the defini-
tive specifications were not available early in the program
when the competition was most intense.
The amount of competition conducted is presented in
tabular form in the following pages. Competition in this
section refers to competition conducted in the initial
program stages. Competition includes both actions the
Government has accepted to be competitive and actions that
are competitive according to the Government definition.
Total contract effort is the value of the contract during
the initial stages of the program. These initial stages
were where most of the new procurement effort occurred, and
included either the Full-Scale Development effort or both
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the Full-Scale Development and initial production, depending
on the program. Subcontracts studied include only those
actions above $500,000.00.
Table 1 shows the amount of dollars available for
subcontracting as a percentage of total contract effort for
the programs identified in Chapter II. (The sequence of
programs presented in Chapter II are not structured in the
same sequence as presented in Table I.) It is generally
expected that from 40% to 60% of any one prime contract will
be subcontracted [Ref . 1: p. 19] . The companies in this
study fell within this range. Table I also shows how much
competition either has been or is projected to be conducted
as a percentage of total contract effort. Combining these
figures shows the extent of competition conducted as a per-
centage of the total contract effort that was available for
subcontracting. These percentages would indicate that, in
some cases at least, prime contractors compete a large
percentage of the subcontracted effort in the initial program
stages. The researcher would observe that increasing the
amount of subcontract competition conducted by the prime
contractors would be difficult without expanding the amount
of effort available for subcontracting.
2 . Subcontractors
Subcontractors were asked to estimate the amount of
competition obtained in the acquisition of goods and
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actions of $25,000.00 or more. This was asked to determine
whether or not there was a significant difference in the
amount of competition conducted that met the subcontractor's
own definition and competition that met the Government's
definition. This question was intended to determine if the
Government definition was overly restrictive. Three com-
panies indicated differing amounts of competition depending
upon which definition was applied. Only one company gave a
reason for this difference, that being the company did not
recognize or include the concept of design/technical compe-
tition. The amounts of subcontract competition conducted by
subcontractors are shown in Table II. The data may indicate
that a much greater amount of competition is being conducted
at the subcontractor level than at the prime contractor level
.
Subcontractor responses indicated that this competitive effort
was of a continuous nature, as the subcontractors relied on
new ideas and products to maintain their competitive edge.
This is in contrast to the situation with the prime contrac-
tors, where most of their competitive effort is concentrated
in the initial stages of the program. The researcher believes
that this could be due to the types of goods and services
obtained, e.g., more basic components and raw materials.
D. SUMMARY
The basic thrust of this chapter has been to ascertain





















































































competition used by the Government, prime contractors, and
their subcontractors. If so, was this difference reflected
in the amount of competition that was being obtained? The
research shows that there is not a significant difference in
the definitions and also not a significant difference in the
amount of competition, using either definition. The re-
searcher believes that this data shows that the Government
definition would be an adequate definition of competition.
The data presented in Tables I and II would indicate that
substantial increases in the amount of subcontract competition
conducted by both the prime contractor and subcontractor
level may not be possible in many cases. Now that some
common concepts regarding competition have been developed,
the next chapter will investigate what motivates prime con-
tractors to compete their subcontracts, what methods they
use to achieve the competition, and their views on how the
amount of subcontract competition could be increased.
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IV. THE NATURE OF SUBCONTRACT COMPETITION
AT THE PRIME CONTRACTOR LEVEL
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will look at the motivators, both positive
and negative, that exist for prime contractors to maintain
competition in their subcontract management. The importance
and effectiveness of these motivators will be assessed. The
prime contractors' procurement procedures used to achieve
subcontract competition will be presented. Finally, prime
contractor ideas on how to increase the amount of subcon-
tract competition are discussed.
B. MOTIVATIONS TO COMPETE SUBCONTRACTS
1 . Corporate Policy and Strategic Motivations
Overall corporate policy at both prime contractors
was that, whenever possible, competitive procurement prac-
tices were to be used to the maximum extent. Beyond the
fundamental statements citing the benefits of competition,
the strongest corporate policy motivator to seek competition
in subcontracts was to achieve lowest possible costs. There
were two main reasons for this desire to keep costs low.
The first reason was to reduce the projected program
costs as much as possible to help the program itself stay
competitive within the DOD budgeting process. Programs with
increasing costs might draw unwanted attention. There is
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real pressure to reduce costs from both the company and the
Government customer with a common goal: to help ensure
program survival.
The second reason is that the contractor wants to
keep costs down to remain competitive for ultimate selection
as prime contractor. If the company is already the prime,
the emphasis changes to include increasing fees or profits
as well as reducing program costs. These primes also believe
that it is important to keep costs down to maintain their
status as the sole/single source.
Both primes believe that competition is one of the
best ways to achieve the lowest price. Several examples
cited by prime contractor personnel showed where single
source suppliers whose prices historically followed a 115-
120% pricing curve, showed a reversal to a decreasing price
curve once the supplier was competing for the business.
Both primes maintain competition among multiple
sources for some items to decrease the risk of schedule
delays caused by supply interruption. Some of these items
were explosive products whose supply could be interrupted
due to rejection of large batches of defective chemical
explosives or destruction of the subcontractor's production
capability due to industrial accidents such as explosions.
The primes also noted that there was an increasing potential
for supply interruption due to political activity such as
protests against local plants or even banning production of
weapon systems in certain communities.
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2 . Contract Provisions and Clauses as Motivators
Generally, neither prime contractor felt motivated to
compete as a result of existing contract provisions or
clauses in their prime contracts. Most contract clauses
dealing with subcontracts address the management of the
subcontracting process; such as determining what documenta-
tion must be in subcontract files, what actions require
consent, and when cost and pricing data is required. The
only clause dealing with competition in subcontracts merely
states that:
The contractor shall select subcontractors (including
suppliers) on a competitive basis to the maximum extent
consistent with the objectives and requirements of the
contract. [Ref. 4: 52.244-5]
Primes reported that this clause does not have any effect,
positive or negative, on the amount of competition conducted.
Other common contract provisions dealing with competition
dealt with the Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR)
and Consent to Subcontract . Although the extent of compe-
tition is an area of key concern in these reviews, the main
result of these requirements was to ensure that the reason
for not competing was well-documented, rather than actually
encouraging competition. This prime emphasized that the
only contract provision that had an effect on the amount of
competition conducted was where specific competitive goals
were assigned as part of the contract. Extensive subcontract
competition was part of the program's acquisition strategy
and was emphasized in seeking Congressional approval for the
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program. These goals were taken very seriously by the prime
contractor; and he was making every effort to meet them.
The researcher felt that in this instance at least as much
motivation came from the prime contractor's corporate
strategy to maintain their sole source position.
3 . Other Motivators
There are other costs, besides direct material costs,
that can be reduced by competition. Sole source contractors
can be difficult to negotiate with effectively, requiring
more time and effort by skilled negotiators to do both the
actual negotiations and then complete all required documen-
tation. One prime also mentioned that competitive sources,
when they encountered production problems, required much less
prime contractor management involvement. When a sole source
encounters production problems, potentially causing delays
in the prime's production, it is generally the prime who has
the greater motivation to solve the problem and generally
will have to send their own management teams to work days,
nights, and weekends until the problems are solved. The
subcontractor will tend to sit back and let the prime solve
the problem for him. The competitive subcontractor knows his
status and therefore will expend all effort to solve the
problem as soon as possible since he knows that the prime
can, with relative ease, get the items from someone else.
One prime had noticed this phenomenon with a particularly
troublesome subcontractor.
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C. DISINCENTIVES TO COMPETE
1 . Environmental
Some disincentives to compete stem from the very nature
of the major weapon systems acquisition process. Early in
the program, extensive competition is conducted. Once the
sources are selected, usually after exhaustive evaluation,
and the exact specifications are determined and incorporated
into the overall design, any changes become extremely costly
to incorporate and can degrade reliability. In many cases,
it is nearly impossible to determine the effect on the system
if another supplier's product was put into the system, even
if it should be the same item. The interviewees indicated
that the potential decrease in reliability is not worth any
potential savings resulting from competition, especially in
contracts where reliability, rather than price, is the over-
riding evaluation criterion. One prime contractor stated that
reliability benefitted greatly from the initial technical
competition. After that initial competition, reliability
was maintained only if the item was not competed. Suppliers
would be changed only if it became impossible to acquire the
product from the current supplier.
Related to the area of reliability are warranties.
Tightened warranty requirements could have an extremely
adverse impact on the prime's subcontract competition pro-
gram. -The prime, wanting to introduce as little risk as
possible, would tend to go only to large, reputable suppliers
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sure to be around to stand by the product if problems develop
in the future. The benefits of greater reliability achieved
through competition would not be enough for the prime to
continue to do business with a large number of smaller
suppliers, preferring instead to deal with fewer numbers of
larger, more stable companies.
Even where it may be desirable to either maintain
competition or reintroduce it during the production phase,
the yearly uncertainty of the Executive Branch and Congressional
budgeting process is enough to discourage investment in develop-
ing alternate sources. If production quantities were known,
better decisions could be made regarding the feasibility of
developing more sources. Also, the relatively small numbers
of items required, even over the entire life cycle of the
weapon system made justification for maintaining competition
difficult
.
One prime contractor stated that the subcontractor
base was shrinking due to increasing subcontractor difficul-
ties in dealing with the prime contract's flow-down provisions.
Generally, many subcontractors don't have to sell to the
Government and indeed, many choose not to, preferring to
sell to prime contractors. But, as this process becomes more
difficult, subcontractors will concentrate on their commer-
cial business. Especially onerous examples cited were:
socio-economic programs, conforming to the Cost Accounting
Standards, rights in technical data, and warranty requirements.
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2 . Corporate Policy and Strategic Disincentives
Teaming arrangements made with other companies in
order to be fully competitive for a contract, reduce the
opportunity for subcontract competition since many of the
major components will be made by one of the team members.
Although the process of selecting team members may be made
in a highly competitive environment, future opportunities
for further competition might be quite small. Although not
exactly a teaming arrangement, one prime contractor encouraged
suppliers, once selected, to consider themselves as part of
the program team for the duration of the program. The strong
"no change" policy of the program reinforces this type of
arrangement
.
Competition is impracticable in many circumstances
and both primes shared common reasons for single and/or sole
source procurement. These reasons were cited in the com-
panys ' material procedures specifying when non-competitive
procedures were appropriate. Whenever one of these situa-
tions was encountered, higher level approval within the prime
was required prior to making the buy. These were: (1) custo-
mer directed source, (2) the new equipment must match existing
systems or equipment, (3) the product is proprietary, and
(4) the existing source is qualified and there are not
sufficient incentives, financial or otherwise, to establish
another source. Once a program is in the production phase,
the most common justification for non-competitive procurement
is the last one, that the existing source is qualified.
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Both prime contractors stated that they felt it was
important to have the flexibility to place orders with
suppliers whose past performance was excellent. They did
not think that competition in those instances would be bene-
ficial if it interferred with an excellent business relation-
ship. One prime contractor named several major sole source
contractors whose prices consistently followed at least a
90% pricing curve.
Numerous other reasons were also cited, most of which
were peculiar to the program or the company's internal proce-
dures and are seldom encountered in major subcontracts.
Examples include: security requirements to protect classi-
fied data, schedule considerations precluding the time to
compete, and specific equipment needed for engineering evalua-
tion. Generally, the dollar value of these purchases was
quite small compared to the total contract value.
D. METHODS OF ACHIEVING COMPETITION
1 . Standard Procurement Procedures
The primes ' standard procurement processes usually
assured that maximum competition was obtained. These
processes included both bidding and negotiating techniques.
Bidding techniques were used when the selection criterion
was lowest price only. This technique was most often used
by the primes to obtain raw materials and common items used
by one or more divisions of the company. Since these items
were not included in the subcontract review, no further
mention of bidding techniques will be made. The procurement
process for major subcontracts was primarily negotation and
this procedure is described below.
The procurement process is designed to assure full
and fair competition through an aggressive program of source
qualification and approval and an impartial source selection
process. One of the most important responsibilities of
contracting personnel is to find qualified suppliers that can
reliably produce the required product at the lowest price.
Both primes maintained extensive subcontractor data bases.
Information for the data bases was gathered primarily from
internal sources such as past performance and results from
plant visits or inspections, with some other basic information
supplied by the subcontractors. In some cases, the prime will
prequalify a potential source if that source seeks to do
business with the prime or if an individual at the prime
level recommends a particular supplier. This information is
translated into ratings that basically either approve or
disapprove a supplier as a source. Both primes had large
numbers of approved suppliers; one of the primes currently
has over 40,000 approved subcontractors. This aggressive
program assures that a maximum number of qualified suppliers
can be included on the bidder's list.
Once the bidder's list is determined and proposals
are requested, the source selection procedures provide a
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thorough, impartial process that documents the selection
criteria used, defines the relative importance of these
selection criteria, and allows for quantitative distinction
between the suppliers that decides the best overall proposal.
Both primes had similar selection criteria, the most impor-
tant being: technical approach, cost, reliability and safety,
product quality, manufacturing capability, management ability,
and financial capability. The weights assigned to the cri-
teria varied, depending on the provisions of the prime
contract and the nature of the item bought.
2. Other
Other methods of increasing competition were observed.
These were Government or prime contractor directed competi-
tion for major components or subsystems, use of Requests
for Information (RFI) to test the market, and use of multiple
or dual sources.
Directed competition by both the Government and the
prime contractor appeared to increase competition at the sub-
contract level . Government-directed competition was a
contract provision of one of the programs examined for this
study. In this case, the Government paid the prime to run
an extensive technical competition conducted between two
bidders. The successful bidder then became a major subcon-
tractor to the prime. When the primes directed competition,
they were motivated by the desire to stay with a single
source, but wanted to get the benefits of competition on
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major items. In one case, the prime designed the items
to be readily available and then directed the subcontractor
to compete them. This was controlled by having purchase
approval authority held at the prime level. In another
case, certain high cost items were identified during cost
analysis of the subcontractor's proposal. The prime con-
tractor then successfully "encouraged" the subcontractor
to compete these items without specifically directing
competition.
One of the primes used RFI ' s instead of RFP ' s to
test the market. Often the prime knew of only one source
that could make the product, but prior to sending an RFP to
that source, would send out RFI ' s to several potential sources
In these cases, the primes were seeking interested bidders
more than definitive proposals. The RFI ' s used were much
less definitive than the typical RFP, usually describing
the desired product in rather general terms. It was designed
to find technically competent and interested suppliers. If
several competent sources responded to the RFI with adequate
proposals, the prime would usually decide to compete the
requirement, at least among the responding suppliers. If
only one supplier responded to the RFI, then it was usually
decided to negotiate directly with that supplier on a single
source basis.
One prime was successfully using dual sourcing on
one of the programs, much more so than observed in any of
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the other programs. In this case, dual sourcing was used
primarily to obtain competitive pricing on high cost items
and to minimize program schedule risk by ensuring critical
hardware availability. The prime felt that dual sourcing
was very successful in substantially reducing the costs of
some items. This prime experienced significant price
decreases when a second source was brought on, or even when the
existing single source thought that the prime was going
to second source the item. The prime stated that they had
observed price decreases of 30-35% as a result of either
actually or threatening to dual source an item. The prime
did note that the dual source threat would work only once
with any one supplier, but if dual sourcing was actually
accomplished, the competition would remain over the life of
the program. The prime was able to assure a steady supply
of critical castings by working hard to make another source
qualified to produce the castings.
E. INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF COMPETITION
Both primes felt that they were sufficiently motivated
to obtain maximum subcontract competition due to the reasons
cited above and there was not much additional internal incen-
tive to increase competition. They suggested several possible
Government actions that would cause increased subcontract
competition, in both the initial and production program
phases. These suggestions were in the areas of: source
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selection criteria for prime contractors, dual and directed
sources, and contract incentives.
By including the amount of subcontract competition as
one of the source selection criteria, the primes felt that
this would directly increase the amount of subcontract
competition. The primes would simply "make it so" to remain
competitive themselves for the prime contract.
One prime expressed frustration because the Government
seemed reluctant to pay the necessary initial costs to
establish a dual subcontractor source, even though the prime
was quite confident that significant cost savings would
result. In fact, this prime contractor thought that the
Government was not very interested in dual sourcing, being
unwilling to fund it until a program got into trouble and
the Government realized that establishing another source
would solve the problem. The prime also stated that the
Government probably had previous dual sourcing experience
in these types of hardware items and could share this infor-
mation to the benefit of both parties. Regarding directed
sources, one prime stated that the Government could increase
the amount of competition merely by reducing the number of
directed sources in prime contracts.
The primes stated that if their profits were directly
affected by the amount of subcontract competition conducted,
they would be able to increase it. They both pointed out
that any incentives in this area would have to be consistent
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with the other incentive provisions. For example, one felt
strongly that increasing competition in the production phase
would significantly reduce reliability. This would be incon-
sistent in a contract where the most important goal was
achieving a certain level of reliability.
F. SUMMARY
There appear to be two primary sources of motivations for
prime contractors to conduct subcontract competition: internal
corporate policies and prime contract provisions and clauses.
The corporate policies emphasize reducing overall program costs
in order to help ensure the continued survival of the program
and to increase corporate profits. Program survival is
usually a key goal of DOD also. Generally, contract provisions
and clauses were not effective motivators . Disincentives
to conduct subcontract competition come from the environment
of major weapon systems acquisition; many of the inherent
characteristics discourage subcontract competition. Some
internal corporate policies were also a disincentive to ob-
taining subcontract competition. These policies are seen as
necessary to increase the competitiveness of the prime con-
tractor and also enable the prime to exercise subcontract
management to best achieve overall corporate goals and prime
contract requirements. The prime contractor's normal pur-
chasing procedures promote competition, and the prime also
uses other methods to achieve subcontract competition.
Prime contractors felt they did not have any additional
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incentive to do more subcontract competition, but gave
several suggestions for Government actions that would cause
them to increase the amount of competition. These were:
providing funding to develop second sources, contract incen-
tives, using amount of subcontract competition as a source
selection criterion, and reducing the number of Government-
directed sources. Several of the prime contractors' methods
of achieving subcontract competition promoted competition
into and throughout the production phase, one of the areas
where it is generally acknowledged to be difficult to achieve
competition. The next chapter will examine these same areas
from the viewpoint of the subcontractors examined during this
study.
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V. THE NATURE OF SUBCONTRACT COMPETITION
CONDUCTED AT THE SUBCONTRACTOR LEVEL
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings
of the questionnaire sent to subcontractors. The responses
covered subcontractors' motivations to compete, the disin-
centives to competition, and how subcontractors achieve and
increase competition.
B. MOTIVATIONS TO COMPETE SUBCONTRACTS
The primary motivators to compete subcontracts were
corporate goals and strategies. The most often cited reason
for competing was to obtain the best quality product at the
lowest possible price. Competitive subcontracting processes
also reduced purchasing administrative costs and lead time.
Awarding to the lowest bidder resulted in a much "cleaner"
purchase by decreasing the amount of supporting documentation,
such as cost and pricing data, and reducing the internal
approvals needed to make the award. The competitive process
also allowed buyers to become more productive by avoiding
long and costly sole source negotiations. Overall, competi-
tion resulted in reduced direct material and direct labor
costs
.
Subcontractors stated that for the above reasons, com-
petition in subcontracts directly increased profits under
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FFP contracts or through increased fees under incentive type
contracts. One of the subcontractors expressly stated that,
being in a highly competitive business, "the profit motive
thus becomes our prime factor" for conducting competition
in subcontracts. Several subcontractors also stated that
having competition helped to assure a greater availability
of parts.
Beyond the immediate effect of increasing profits, sub-
contract competition helped subcontractors achieve some of
their long term, strategic goals. One goal mentioned was
the potential to increase market share due to offering more
advanced products as competition increased their knowledge
of new techniques and different components on the market.
A solid base of subcontractors that could provide the best
mix of cost, performance, and schedule gave the subcontrac-
tors the increased chance of winning future contracts due to
a lower cost base.
One subcontractor reported receiving no benefit from
competition, but did it only to "keep the Government auditors
happy.
"
C. DISINCENTIVES TO COMPETE SUBCONTRACTS
Two basic sources of disincentives to compete subcontracts
were identified: those external to the subcontractor and
those internal to the subcontractor. The external disin-
centives can be categorized as being either market conditions
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or customer imposed constraints, normally beyond the subcon-
tractor's control. The internal disincentives were policies
and procedures set by the subcontractor.
1 . External Disincentives
a. Market Conditions
(1) The lack of qualified suppliers was one of the
problems cited by a majority of subcontractors. This situa-
tion was caused by numerous factors. One of the most impor-
tant factors was due to the nature of the subcontractor's
business. Many of the subcontractor's requirements are for
advanced, state-of-the-art items and there may be only two
or three sources that have the engineering, technical, manu-
facturing, and quality capabilities necessary to provide
these items. In some cases, several suppliers may have
tried to make the part, but all but one has failed to make
the part profitably. Another factor cited was that only one
supplier was able to produce the required quantity on schedule
The difficulty in qualifying new suppliers also restricted
the number of suppliers. Subcontractors noted that the
qualification process could be expensive and time consuming.
Also, one subcontractor stated that new or prospective
suppliers were unable to define their capabilities and skills
accurately enough to allow the subcontractor to determine
what products the supplier could provide.
(2) The second most often mentioned disincentive to sub-
contract competition was proprietary items. Again, the
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state-of-the-art was such that only one company had the
specialized knowledge or techniques to make the part and/or
it was protected by patents. There being little substituta-
bility of these parts, few if any, equivalent parts were
available.
(3) Finally, some subcontractors noted that even where
price competition was appropriate, some suppliers had an
overwhelming advantage due to their past experience with
producing the item and learning curve effects. This past
experience can be invaluable in producing the items as
sometimes not all required knowledge necessary to make the
part can be defined and written into specifications. Some
of the subcontractors referred to some of their suppliers'
capabilities as more of an art than a science,
b. Customer Imposed Constraints
(1) Subcontractors felt the prime contractor limited com-
petition by directing sources of items. The subcontractors
noted that this was sometimes a flow-down requirement from
the Government, rather than the prime contractor. Restrict-
ing procurement to sources on the Qualified Parts List (QPL)
frequently restricted competition. Although the necessity
of the QPL was accepted, some subcontractors thought more
suppliers could be included if the Government or prime con-
tractor were willing to pay for qualifying additional sources
"No change" policies of the prime contractors for the life
of the program were also cited as restricting competition.
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(2) Many subcontractors felt that not enough proposal or
bid preparation time was allowed by the prime contractor,
precluding them from fully using their supplier base.
Another time constraint was the relatively short delivery
lead times for items, further restricting the number of sources
that could respond.
(3) Subcontractors stated that the relatively small number
of items typically procured prevented efficient production
runs. Also, uncertainty regarding future volume hampered long
term requirements forecasting that would encourage suppliers
to invest funds in tooling to become qualified to produce
the item. A related problem was that the prime would change
the production quantities, causing the subcontractors'
suppliers excessive bidding costs and also causing supplier
reluctance to become involved in Government business.
(4) One subcontractor felt that some of his suppliers
were unwilling to become involved in Government contracts,
because of the potential for becoming entangled in many of
the "weighty and burdensome" contract flow-down provisions.
2 . Internal Disincentives
Many subcontractors felt it very important to maintain
long term relationships with those suppliers who had per-
formed well in the past. These suppliers had consistently
provided high quality products on time. The suppliers'
personnel had acquired specialized, detailed knowledge that
was reflected in the superior reliability of the suppliers'
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products. These suppliers reduce the subcontractor's in-house
inspection costs. The subcontractors felt these suppliers
had earned the right to the business. Competition in these
situations endangered an advantageous business relationship
for questionable gains; such as introducing competition merely
for the sake of competition. Subcontractors felt the risks
inherent in shifting sources did not, in general, offset
possible price reductions.
Another area concerned placing awards on a follow-on
basis to competition. Subcontractors do not feel it is always
cost-effective to recompete additional quantities because
these quantities are generally few in number and subcon-
tractors will want to take advantage of sunk development
costs with particular suppliers. Also, a previous supplier
may have enough material/parts stocks on hand to make the
item relatively quickly and easily.
Some other internal policies or conditions that
restricted competition were: subcontractor's policy to buy
from original equipment manufacturers and a lack of skilled
buying personnel who could find several qualified suppliers
for any particular item.
D. METHODS OF ACHIEVING AND INCREASING SUBCONTRACT
COMPETITION
1 . Methods of Achieving Competition
The majority of subcontractors felt that most of their
normal, standard purchasing procedures were competitive and
71
also compatible with the Government's definition of competi-
tion. Procedures mentioned were categorized by the researcher
into statement of work reviews, source selection procedures,
and source development efforts.
Under statement of work reviews, subcontractors stated
they structured Requests for Quotations (RFQ) or RFPs to
encourage and enhance competition by using general specifica-
tions. They did this by eliminating specific part numbers
where possible and cautioning buyers against routinely accept-
ing proprietary part numbers and drawings from technical
personnel. The subcontractors also, when possible, tried to
provide a flexible delivery schedule of different quantities,
all of which would satisfy the basic requirement. One sub-
contractor mentioned engineer training in the area of differ-
ent suppliers availability and capability as being an impor-
tant part of this effort. However, one subcontractor stated
that "development of competition should be based on sound
economical tradeoffs; i.e. the cost saved/derived from seeking
the competitive bids versus the administrative costs incurred
by such action."
Most subcontractors referred to "normal purchasing
practices" or "standard industry practices" in response to
questions about source selection procedures. Some specific
comments suggested techniques quite similar to those utilized
by the prime contractor discussed in the previous chapter.
These were contract award based upon price and past
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performance or a combination of lowest price, best product,
and satisfactory delivery schedule. Several subcontractors
stated that it was important for the suppliers to realize
the subcontractor's policy was to obtain maximum competition.
These subcontractors expressed difficulty in convincing
suppliers they were serious in their efforts to compete.
Several subcontractors included maintaining a comprehensive
supplier data base containing past performance information
as important to being able to get an adquate number of
suppliers on the bidding list.
Source development efforts encompassed both efforts
to expand competition for current requirements and to increase
the base of competitive suppliers for future requirements.
Because most of these efforts also increased the amount of
competition over the long term, source development efforts
are included in the next section's discussion on increasing
competition.
A few purchasing practices were identified by the
subcontractor as being competitive, but they felt these were
inconsistent with the Government's definition. These prac-
tices were mentioned only by one or two subcontractors and
did not seem to have wide application. These practices
included:
a. conducting "all or nothing" annual competitions for
total estimated requirements for common items;
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b. opening discussions on possible cost reductions with
suppliers during the bidding process, and
c. defining Government directed sources as competitive.
2 . Methods of Increasing Competition
Many subcontractors stated it would be difficult to
increase the amount of subcontract competition since they
were already doing as much as possible or feasible. However,
many other subcontractors had aggressive programs to increase
competition. Some subcontractors stated that prime contrac-
tor actions could cause them to increase competition.
Source development was one of the most common methods
of increasing competition by increasing the size of the
subcontractor base. The normal methods of achieving competi-
tion identified above still need additional sources to realize
the full potential of these methods. One of a buyer's major
responsibilities is to find acceptable suppliers. Subcon-
tractors used many methods to find new suppliers and keep
existing ones:
a. maintaining an open door policy to let suppliers
know that they can compete for the subcontractors '
business;
b. holding briefings with all interested suppliers to
acquaint them with potential programs and subcon-
tractor procurement goals;
c. holding debriefing sessions with unsuccessful suppliers
to inform them why they did not win the subcontract
and what they need to do to become more competitive;
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d. encouraging long term relationships with suppliers,
encouraging them to make tooling investments and
providing suppliers with engineering and other
technical support (no financial support)
;
e. maintaining an aggressive Small and Disadvantaged
Business Program, and
f. treating suppliers fairly and honestly, and paying
their invoices promptly.
There were several possible prime contractor actions
that would cause the subcontractors to increase the amount
of competition they achieved. Relaxing or alleviating any
of the prime contractor imposed constraints would serve to
increase competition. Prime contractors could also direct
the subcontractors to obtain more competition, identify more
qualified sources, make more FFP contracts with the subcon-
tractors, or have incentive provisions in subcontracts for
the amount of competition achieved.
E . S UMMARY
This chapter has presented findings that many subcon-
tractors 1 motivations to compete are primarily internal.
These included increasing profits and potentially increasing
market share and chances of winning future contracts. There
are significant disincentives to conducting subcontract
competition, but many of these are beyond the direct control
of the individual subcontractor. These included existing
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market conditions and customer imposed constraints. Subcon-
tractors have adequate methods of achieving competition, and
make long term efforts to increase the size of their supplier
base to ensure future competition. Some direct prime con-
tractor actions could cause the subcontractors to increase
the amount of competition achieved, such as, directing more
competition, identifying qualified sources, and contract
incentives. The next chapter will discuss these findings in
conjunction with the findings of the two previous chapters
and the implications of these findings on Government policy.
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VI . GOVERNMENT POLICY IMPLICATIONS ON PRIME
CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the policy implications for
the Government based on the findings at the prime contractor
and subcontractor levels. Identified differences in the
definitions of competition will be examined to arrive at a
common definition. The necessity of having a common defini-
tion is also discussed. Current Government policy and its
effects on achieving and increasing subcontract competition
are evaluated using the prime contractors' and subcontrac-
tors' motivations to compete as determined by this study.
Included will be an assessment of the amount of subcontract
competition conducted by both the prime contractors and the
subcontractors
.
B. DEFINITION OF COMPETITION
This study found that both prime contractors and most
of the subcontractors ageed with the Government's definition
of competition. The exact agreement with the rigorous
Government definition of price competition could be due to
the requirement to submit cost and pricing data for subcon-
tracts that are awarded without adequate price competition
[Ref. 4: 15-804-3]. This policy forces a common definition
as this study found it was not worthwhile for contractors
to have more than one definition of price competition.
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The major difference was in the number of sources solicited
The Government, in its procurements, uses extensive bidders
lists and public notices to attract as many potential sources
as possible. This is motivated, in part, by the desire to
obtain the direct benefits of competition. Since the market
in which major weapons systems are acquired is characterized
by relatively few sellers, the Government must ensure that
its needs are known to as many potential sources as possible.
There is also a desire to obtain an indirect benefit of keep-
ing the Government procurement process open to public scrutiny
and providing a fair chance of participating in the Government
market to as many companies as possible [Ref . 8: p. 29] .
In contrast, the commercial market in which the contrac-
tors operate to obtain their own purchased material is
characterized by more sellers of substitute products and more
competition. The contractors benefit from this in that they
can preselect potential bidders from among known sources
that they feel will provide the best product and service.
This reduces the contractor's evaluation costs and risk of
unacceptable contract performance. It also reduces the bid
preparation costs to firms that do not have much, if any,
chance of winning the contract.
The Government and most contractors specified two or more
sources were needed to achieve adequate competition, while
some of the contractors required at least three sources for
competition. The differences in number of sources solicited
does not seem significant, considering the different goals
and market structures facing the Government and the contractors
Although there was substantial agreement on what was
competition, there was disagreement on how to categorize
some subcontracting actions, primarily follow-on to competi-
tion. This disagreement stems in part from the problem of
how long after the initial competition does the benefit of
the initial competition apply to subsequent buys of the same
item from the same source. One of the primes considered the
benefit to last about one year, the other considered the
benefit to last indefinitely. The prime contractors want
to consider follow-on to competition as a competitive action.
The Government now identifies follow-on to competition
as a separate category of procurement action, distinct from
being either competitive or non-competitive. The researcher
would observe that this issue is more one of categorization
than of definition. Follow-on actions usually occur in the
production phase and there are other issues that are at
least, if not more, important as competition. These issues
include: supplier performance in meeting quality and delivery
schedules, pricing history, and effect on the overall system
of changing sources of the component.
The question of which category follow-on actions should
be placed seems best considered on a case-by-case basis,
considering the relatively few major subcontracts in the
major weapon systems reviewed. The important idea is that
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follow-on to competition actions have received some benefit
from competition, and if not considered wholly competitive,
at least they are now identified separately.
It is evident that the Government's definition of price
and design/technical competition is acceptable and can be
used when a common definition is necessary. Potentially the
most frequent use of a common definition would be to measure
the amount of subcontract competition. In this case, each
of the contractor's procurement actions should be examined
and categorized as being either competitive or non-competitive
at the beginning of the contract.
C. ISSUES IN ACHIEVING AND INCREASING SUBCONTRACT
COMPETITION AT THE PRIME CONTRACTOR LEVEL
The Government has four programs designed to enhance
competition at the subcontractor level: CPSR, Consent to
Subcontracts, Make-or-Buy, and Component Breakout. The
Government uses its direct contractual relationship with the
prime contractor to participate in these programs.
It is interesting to note there is a perception of little
competition in the market for major weapon systems. These
prime contractors ' primary motivations to obtain competition
are due to an incentive to reduce program costs. They felt
these reduced costs were critical to keep the program com-
petitive, to remain competitive themselves for eventual
selection as the prime contractor, or to maintain their
existing single/sole source status. Furthermore, the
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programs that are used to introduce the effects of competi-
tion are not considered by the primes to be a major factor
in determining the amount of subcontract competition conducted
One prime contractor stated that they did not avoid non-
competitive subcontracts when the reasons could be fully
documented. This would suggest that efforts to increase
subcontract competition through greater emphasis on these
programs may not be fully effective.
The prime contractors also use competition to minimize
schedule risk by developing several suppliers for the same
critical material. Although the primary purpose of this
effort is to ensure delivery schedule compliance; clearly
price competition benefits are available.
Finally, in some situations, it is just not in the best
interest of the prime contractor to let a sole source develop
due to the poor performance of that company. The subcontract
management effort becomes difficult and frustrating as
well as potentially jeopardizing the prime contractor's
performance. The prime contractor's sensitivity to these
potential situations seems sufficient motivation for the
prime to avoid these situations.
Interestingly, none of the competition enhancing programs
reinforce or take advantage of these motivators. Perhaps
some effort should be put into developing programs that are
more in line with these motivators. The prime contractors
were also able to identify situations where competitive
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subcontracting was advantageous. There are two Government
efforts that would exploit both the prime contractors ' moti-
vations and expertise in identifying advantageous competitive
subcontracting situations. These are: including the amount
of subcontract competition proposed as a source selection
criterion on prime contracts and the use of incentive or award
fees. The additional source selection criterion would allow
the potential prime contractor to weigh his internal benefits
of subcontract competition against the potential risk of not
remaining competitive for the prime contract. Perhaps the
Make-or-Buy program could be modified to require a competition
in subcontracting proposal for those items to be bought.
Incentive or award fees would motivate the prime contractor
to obtain double benefits of competing; those obtained from
the competition and those obtained from the increased fees.
There are some potential problems in using incentive fees.
Some effort would have to be made to ensure the primary
benefit received from competing was not solely the increased
fees. There must be some way to ensure that actual benefits
accrue to the Government as a result of the competition.
This would prevent conducting competition merely for the
sake of competition. Another consideration is the importance
that the incentive fee structure be consistent with the over-
all program goals and objectives. This would ensure that some
areas, such as reliability or logistical support would not
be degraded.
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There were many disincentives that prevented the prime
contractors from obtaining more competition. The main
source of these were problems inherent in the major weapons
system market, overall program uncertainty in both program
continuation and actual quantities. The prime contractors
felt that with greater quantity certainty they could find
more sources willing to bid, and thus obtain lower prices.
These types of problems are generally recognized within the
Government and some improvements, such as Multi-year Con-
tracting, are being tried. However, the primes did state
that this program uncertainty did motivate them to try to
minimize costs to help ensure the program's survival through
the budgeting process. It appears that the Government is
obtaining some benefit from this uncertainty.
One prime contractor felt the Government was not inter-
ested in funding the development of second sources during
the production phase. In this case, the prime recognized
several opportunities for achieving competition and lower
prices through second sourcing. The Government was not
interested in providing the necessary funds to develop the
additional source. The prime contractor is understandably
unwilling to spend the funds himself given the yearly program
uncertainty inherent in the budgeting process.
Other disincentives are the result of corporate policies,
such as teaming agreements, desire to maximize benefits of
dealing with existing qualified sources, and the desire
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to maintain an excellent and mutually beneficial business
relationship with a supplier. While all of these are legiti-
mate concerns and logical reasons for not competing, there
are some methods that the Government could use to motivate
competition in these areas.
The two methods mentioned above, source selection cri-
terion and incentive fees would apply here also. The Govern-
ment would be forcing the prime contractors to, in effect,
put a price tag on these policies, and then let the contrac-
tor bear the cost or penalties of not competing. Another
method would be the use of directed competition. The primes
stated that this would cause them to do more subcontract
competition although they felt that they were already achiev-
ing a very high level of such competition. The threat of
component breakout would be useful to achieve subcontract
competition. There is the risk that if the prime contractor
will not compete it, the Government will and provide it to
the prime as Government-furnished equipment. This would reduce
the prime contractor's profits, so the prime would probably
choose competing the subcontract as the lesser of two evils
in this case.
The results of this study showed that for some programs,
a great deal of competition was conducted in the initial
program stages. While no precise data were collected on the
amount of competition currently being conducted on these
major subcontracts, it was observed that the prime contractors
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had placed nearly all subsequent orders with the original
subcontractor on a follow-on to competition basis. The re-
searcher did observe the effect of specification changes on
one program. The changes were required to provide basically
the same system with improved capabilities to another cus-
tomer. The prime was successful in introducing competition
for both new and existing components. This competition re-
sulted in lower prices for the existing components.
The recent interest in the amount of prime contractor's
subcontract competition stems from the current initiatives
in the Executive Branch to increase the amount of competition
in procurement. Since subcontracting represents a large
portion of the procurement effort, it is felt that efforts
should be made to increase competition in subcontracts as
well [Ref. 1: p. 20]. The results of this study and the one
conducted by the Army Procurement Research Office show that
there is a wide range in the amount of competition conducted,
depending upon the nature of the program [Ref. 2: p. 25]
.
This would suggest to the researcher that perhaps efforts to
increase subcontract competition should be made on a case-
by-case basis rather than by implementing broad procurement
actions. The researcher also observed that where the material
was being procured on a non-competitive basis, there were
excellent reasons for so doing. While the amount of subcon-
tracts awarded on a follow-on to competition basis during the
production phase is high, arbitrary efforts to increase the
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amount of competition must be avoided. The researcher
observed many instances where other program goals were being
met, in part at least, because of the benefits of remaining
with one source. This is not to say that competition in
subcontracts and other program goals are mutually exclusive,
only that efforts to increase subcontract competition must
be done with the specific goals and objectives of the program
in mind.
D. ISSUES IN ACHIEVING AND INCREASING SUBCONTRACT
COMPETITION AT THE SUBCONTRACTOR LEVEL
One of the differences between the Government-prime con-
tractor relationship and the Government-subcontractor relation-
ship is the lack of "privity of contract" between the
Government and the subcontractors. The Government will
not be able to directly influence the subcontractor in the
same manner as the prime contractor. The Government, if
wishing to modify subcontractor behavior, will have to
either achieve it through overall policy (such as socio-
economic programs) or through the prime contractor in the
form of flow-down provisions.
This study showed that the primary motivators of subcon-
tractors to compete were to reduce costs and increase profits.
Most of them believed their market was highly competitive
and their future growth depended in large part, upon them-
selves remaining competitive through reduced costs and
increased technical knowledge gained through competition.
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The implication for Government policy here is to, either
directly or indirectly, try to maximize its use of the market
forces at this level. This means the Government should in-
sist that prime contractors compete more as discussed above
and that the Government can participate directly in the
market through the Component Breakout program. The problem
here is that the Government's objectives for the Component
Breakout program might be more socio-economic oriented,
rather than the more direct benefits obtained from paying
lower prices for its material.
The primary disincentives to competition found in this
study were either internal in the form of the individual
subcontractor's policies or external in the form of market
conditions or customer imposed constraints.
Due to the lack of "privity of contract," the Government
probably cannot exert much influence over the firm's internal
policies. The exception to this is when the subcontractor is
also a prime contractor to the Government on another program.
When this is the case, some of the competitive policies of
the Government may carry over to the method in which the
company conducts its subcontracting. Several subcontractors,
who were also prime contractors, mentioned that in many
cases, they consistently performed their subcontract operations
under the same terms as their prime contracts because it was
too difficult to maintain separate systems. One subcontrac-
tor noted that even his strictly commercial subcontracting
was reviewed by the Government during the CPSR.
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Several of the subcontractors mentioned the lack of
qualified suppliers due to the state-of-the-art and specialized
application products required. There does not seem to be
much the Government could do to affect this.
One of the customer imposed constraints was another
reflection of the nature of major weapon system acqui-
sition. Relatively small numbers of items required caused
small production runs and discouraged several suppliers
from making the necessary investment to participate in this
market. The Government effort's noted above, such as Multi-
Year contracting, would also help alleviate this situation.
Inadequate bid preparation time was also cited as reduc-
ing the amount of competition obtained by subcontractors.
It was not clear if this was caused by the Government or by
the prime contractor's management. If it is caused by a
prime contractor's actions, then Government incentives for
the prime to increase his subcontract competition should
reduce this type of disincentive.
The only area where the Government can be of direct
influence is by reducing the number of directed or restricted
sources. Subcontractors stated they were unable to obtain
maximum competition due to the number of directed or restricted
sources and also indicated they felt that this was caused by
the Government specifications. The Government could alleviate
this situation by carefully reviewing specification packages
to identify and eliminate overly restrictive specifications.
Subcontractors stated they used "standard industry" or
"normal purchasing" practices for source selection proce-
dures. The subcontractors also aggressively pursued new
source development. This is reflected in the amount of
competition, as measured in this study, obtained by the
subcontractors. More than half of the subcontractors reported
that they obtained competition in over 80% of their purchase
actions exceeding $25,000.00. This would indicate that even
though the prime contractor may stay with a particular supplier
on a follow-on to competition basis, there is still a con-




The Government definition of competition seems to be
adequate for use as a common definition, when one is needed.
Some types of purchase actions, such as follow-on to compe-
tition, may need to be defined as being either competitive
or non-competitive on a case-by-case basis, although current
Government policy is to place follow-on to competition actions
in a separate category. There is potential for existing
Government programs to cause increased subcontract competi-
tion at the prime contractor level, but there are also some
other actions the Government could take that would exploit
the prime contractor motivations, as determined by this study,
to increase subcontract competition. These are: including
the amount of proposed subcontract competition in the prime
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contractor source selection criteria and using incentive
fees. There appears to be a significant amount of competi-
tion conducted at the subcontractor level . The study showed
there is one indirect action the Government could take to
enhance the amount of competition conducted at this level:
reducing the number of directed or restricted sources.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion #1. The Government's definition of competition
can be used as a common definition of competition . The prime
contractors and subcontractors examined during this study
agreed with the Government definition of design/technical
competition with only minor exceptions. As discussed in
Chapter III, they also basically accepted the Government's
definition of price competition, essentially because of the
use of this definition in determining the requirement for
cost and pricing data.
Conclusion #2. Not all procurement actions that prime
contractors and subcontractors consider to be competitive
are compatible with the Government's definition of competition
As identified in Chapter III, most of the disagreement is
centered around follow-on to competition actions. The prime
contractors felt these actions should be considered competi-
tive. The Government has established separate categories
in their procurement data collection system to recognize the
unique aspects of this type of action, and now considers it
neither a competitive nor a non-competitive action.
Conclusion #3. A significant amount of subcontract
competition is conducted by prime contractors in the early
stages of program development. As discussed in Chapters III
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and VI, this occurs because definitive specifications have
not been determined, and there are still opportunities to
consider alternatives. Once the specifications become
definitized, it is not only more difficult to get subcon-
tract competition, but the prime is more reluctant to try
to get a different source. The prime contractor's goals such
as cost, reliability, and maintainability are well-established
and the prime is reasonably assured that the existing subcon-
tractor will perform adequately to allow the prime contractor
to achieve these goals. Subcontract competition is difficult
due to the risk of changing sources and the financial costs
of developing a second source. As a result, during the
production phase, prime contractors tend to remain with those
subcontractors selected during the initial stages and award
subsequent subcontracts on a follow-on to competition basis.
This characteristic is very similar to competition in the
acquisition of the major weapon system itself during the
production stages. The lack of competition during production
is caused, at least in part, by the inherent characteristics
of the major weapon system acquisition process. There are
opportunities for additional subcontract competition in the
production phase, but the Government may have to take direct
contractual action to cause the competition to occur.
Conclusion #4. Surveillance systems, such as Contractor
Purchasing System Review (CPSR) , and contract clauses to
increase subcontract competition do not seem to be effective
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in motivating prime contractors to obtain subcontract
competition . The prime contractor statements discussed in
the section on prime contractor motivations in Chapter IV
confirm this. While these systems may not result in in-
creased subcontract competition, they do require that non-
competitive actions be fully justified and documented. From
this study, efforts to increase subcontract competition
through increased emphasis on these systems does not appear
to be effective.
Conclusion #5. Prime contractors are quite motivated to
obtain subcontract competition when it is consistent with
achieving their corporate goals . The role of corporate
goals as motivators to compete was brought out in Chapter
IV. Their goals are to reduce costs through subcontract
competition in order to: (1) help ensure the program's
survival through the budgetary process, and (2) help maintain
the contractor's existing status either as a strong competi-
tor for eventual selection as the prime contractor or as the
existing single source. Methods of increasing subcontract
competition that utilize these motivations should effectively
increase the amount of subcontract competition conducted by
prime contractors.
Conclusion #6. There are two primary methods by which the
Government can take advantage of contractor motivations to
compete subcontracts . As seen from the analysis in Chapter
VI, these are: (1) including the amount of subcontract
competition proposed as one of the prime contractor source
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selection criteria, and (2) using award fees to increase
profits. In many cases, the prime contractor has the knowl-
edge to determine the most effective amounts of components
to compete.
Conclusion #7. A significant amount of subcontract
competition is conducted by first tier subcontractors . A
majority of first tier subcontractors reported obtaining
over 80% of their required material competitively. This
appears to be a higher level of competition than achieved
by prime contractors. Competition is continuously conducted
by subcontractors and is a more permanent characteristic of
competition at this level, rather than occurring only during
the early stages of program development.
Conclusion #8. There are several opportunities for the
Government to increase subcontract competition at both the
prime contractor and subcontractor levels . Increases at the
prime contractor level can be achieved in both the initial
program stages and the production phase. Government actions
include: reinforcement of the primes' motivations to achieve
corporate goals, providing funding for the development of
additional sources, reducing the number of directed sources,
and requiring the prime contractor to increase the amount
of subcontract competition on a program basis through con-
tractually established goals. There is less opportunity
for direct Government action to increase competition at the
subcontract level. The primary method identified during
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Recommendation #1. The Department of Defense should
promulgate guidance for classifying contractor purchasing
practices as either competitive or non-competitive . Although
the Government definition of competition is commonly accepted,
there is considerable controversy over the classification of
procurement actions . This guidance could be promulgated in
a revision to Part 4, "Administrative Matters," of the
Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations
.
Recommendation #2. Government efforts to increase the
amount of subcontract competition obtained by prime contrac -
tors should reinforce the prime contractors' motivations
to obtain competition and not rely on existing programs .
Broad policy statements concerning the benefits and desira-
bility of subcontract competition should be promulgated
while the use of standardized across-the-board methods and
fixed goals would be inappropriate. Subcontract competition
goals and the methods used to achieve these goals should be
tailored to the individual program. These tailored goals
and methods should be incorporated into the terms and condi-
tions of the individual contracts.
Recommendation #3. The Government should maintain a
diligent effort to eliminate Government-imposed barriers to
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subcontract competition/ such as directed sources and lack
of funding for the development of additional sources . These
barriers were determined to have a significant adverse
impact on the amount of subcontract competition conducted.
Directed sources could be reduced through increased Govern-
ment efforts to acquire data rights. Funding requirements
for additional source development should be identified and
requested during initial program stages.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1
.
What are the nature and extent of competitive actions
by Department of Defense prime contractors and their subcon -
tractors in 'non-competitive' acquisitions of major weapon
systems ? This study found that both prime contractors and
their subcontractors: a. conduct a substantial amount of
subcontract competition, b. have procurement practices that
are compatible with the Government definition of competition,
and c. have strong internal motivation to conduct subcontract
competition. Existing Government methods of encouraging prime
contractors to obtain subcontract competition do not have a
significant impact on the amount of competition achieved.
There are methods the Government could use to obtain more
subcontract competition.
2 How much is ultimately awarded on a competitive
basis by these prime contractors and their subcontractors ?
As shown in Chapter III, there is a significant amount of
competition conducted by both prime contractors and their
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subcontractors. While the prime contractors conduct most of
their competition at the initial stages, the subcontractors
obtain competition on a continuous, routine basis.
3
.
What types of actions do the prime contractors and
their subcontractors consider to be competitive and are these
actions compatible with the Government's definition of
competition ? This was discussed in Chapters IV and V.
Actions prime contractors considered as competitive are
price competition, competitive negotiation, follow-on to
competition, and internal technical reviews. Of these, price
competition and competitive negotiations were fully consistent
with the Government's definition. The subcontractors were
less specific, but generally described methods and actions
quite similar to those of the prime contractors.
4 Is there a working definition of competition that can
be used to describe "effective competition" and would this
definition be consistent with the Government definition of
competition ? As brought out in Chapters III and VI, the
Government's definition of competition is widely accepted
and can be used as a common definition. What constitutes
"effective competition" can be determined on a case-by-case
basis and would be reflected by the types of purchase actions
classified as competition under the terms of the contract.
5 What is current Department of Defense policy on prime
contractors ' competing among their subcontractors and does
this policy have an effect on the amount of competition
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conducted by prime contractors ? Current Department of Defense
policy, as discussed in Chapters II and IV, is for prime
contractors to achieve maximum subcontract competition
consistent with other contract requirements and objectives.
As brought out in Chapter IV, this policy, as currently
implemented, does not have a substantial impact on the amount
of subcontract competition conducted by the prime contractors.
6 . What motivates prime contractors and their subcon -
tractors to compete their requirements and does current
Department of Defense policy reinforce these motivations ?
As discussed in Chapter IV, this study found prime contractors
were extremely motivated to compete if they could achieve
internal corporate goals thus reducing costs and maintaining
the competitiveness of the company. Current Department of
Defense subcontracting policy is not consistent with these
goals
.
D. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY
1. With the increased attention on the amount of subcon-
tract competition, there will probably be efforts to establish
systems to measure the extent of such competition. Although
the recent OFPP study recommended that no additional data
collection systems were necessary, there is still the possi-
bility that Congress or other organizations may decide to
require the collection of this data. The researcher found
very little concern with measuring the amount of subcontract
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competition for large subcontracts (over $500,000), such as
the ones in this study. These contracts are relatively few
in number and already receive focused management attention.
A measurement problem could exist on smaller subcontracts
and for purchases of common material that is used by several
programs being built by the same prime contractor. In addition
to the need for a formal data collection system, a method of
allocating the amount of competition to each of the individual
programs must be devised. The design of such a system re-
quires further study.
2. Most of the subcontractor respondents to this study
were also prime contractors. While this is probably indica-
tive of the degree of concentration within the defense indus-
try, there are numerous subcontractors who are not prime
contractors. As noted in this study, the terms and conditions
of the prime contract tends to influence subcontracting
methods. Subcontractors who do not have a prime contract
with the Government may have a different perspective on sub-
contract competition. A study should be done concentrating




QUESTIONS USED IN PRIME CONTRACTOR INTERVIEWS
1. What is your definition of competition and how does it
differ from the Government's definition?
2. What prevents you from doing more subcontract competition?
3. What would motivate you to do more competition?
4. What could the Government do to motivate you to obtain
more competition?
5. What Government policies (i.e., contract provisions)
prevent you from obtaining more competition?
6. What, if any, benefits does your company derive from
competition and how important are these benefits to you?
7. Describe the purchase practices that your company uses
that you consider to be competitive, but they do not
meet the Government definition of competition.
8. What are the primary reasons for your having single or
sole source contracts?
9. What do you do to encourage competition among your
subcontractors?
10. What existing contract provisions encourage you to
maximize the use of competition?
11. Do you maintain a data base on your subcontractors and
if so, what information do you maintain in the data base?
12. Do you consider your competitive practices and resulting
competitive subcontractor base to be a valuable asset




The Government recognizes two forms of competition:
1) price competition and 2) technical competition. The
Government defines price competition to be where offers are
solicited from all known sources and at least two responsible
offerors who can satisfy the requirement independently contend
for the contract by submitting responsive offers. Further-
more, the low offeror cannot have such a competitive advantage
that he is practically immune to competitive forces and
the lowest price offered is reasonable. The Government defines
design or technical competition to be where two or more quali-
fied sources of supply are invited to submit design or techni-
cal proposals, with the contract award based primarily upon
this factor, rather than price alone.
What is your company's definition of competition and how
does it differ from the above definitions? Please write your
definition of competition and explain any differences in the
space below.
Please compare YOUR DEFINITION with the GOVERNMENT'S DEFINITION
to answer the next four questions. (If there is no difference,
please answer using only the government's definition.)
YOUR DEFINITION GOV'T DEFINITION
1) Approximately what per- 0-19% 0-19%
centage of the goods and 20-39% 20-39%
services that you buy is 40-59% 40-59%
obtained on a competitive 60-79% 60-79%
basis? (Include only above 80% aboge 80%
subcontracts over $25,000)
(Circle one in each column)
2) What prevents you from
getting more of each
type of competition In
your subcontracting?
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YOUR DEFINITION GOVT DEFINITION
3) What could the prime
contractor do that
would motivate you
to obtain more com-
petition in your
subcontracting?
4) What other things,
besides prime con-
tractor actions, would




1) What, if any, benefits does your company derive from
competing your requirements and how important are
these benefits to you?
2) Are you a prime contractor for any DOD contracts and, if
so, please describe any differences in your competitive
procedures between those used for your commercial business
and those used for your Government business.
Describe the purchasing practices that your company uses
that you consider to be competitive, but DO NOT MEET
the Government definition of competition.
Describe the purchasing practices that your company uses
that you consider to be competitive, and MEET the
Government definition of competition.
5) What are the primary reasons (at least four) for your
having single and/or sole source subcontractors?
6) What do you think are the three most significant barriers
to your obtaining more effective competition among your
subcontractors?
7) What actions do you take that encourages or increases
effective competition among your subcontractors?
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Do you maintain a data base on your subcontractors and,
if so, what information do you maintain in the data
base?
Thank you very much for your time and effort. Please return
by 13 April to:
LT Stephen Smith, SC, USN
SMC 18 89
Naval Postgraduate School
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